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Summary   
 
 
In this paper we empirically analyze the linkages among economic reforms, human capital, physical 
infrastructure, and growth for a panel of 44 developing countries over 1970-80 to 1999. For this purpose, we 
generate aggregated reform indicators using principal component analysis. We show that the growth 
performance of the MENA region has been disappointing because these economies have lagged behind in terms 
of economic reforms. However, our analysis also reveals that the growth dividend of some reforms has been 
small. This is the case when structural reforms are implemented in an unstable macroeconomic environment 
(which corresponds to the situation of the MENA countries in the 1980s), and when macroeconomic reforms are 
accompanied by a low level of structural reforms (as observed during the 1990s). Our result illustrates the 
complementarities between reforms as modeled by Mussa (1987) and Williamson (1994). Actually, after human 
capital and physical infrastructure, our analysis finds that macroeconomic and external stability are key variables 














1.  Introduction 
 
This paper explores the relationship between economic reforms and growth in the MENA economies.  
Despite apparent reforms starting in the mid-1980s, the growth performance of the region has often been 
disappointing. Since the large fall in international oil prices in the mid-1980s, most MENA economies have 
experienced a marked slowdown and/or macroeconomic crisis. In spite of a small recovery of GDP per capita in 
the 1990s (from -1 percent in the 1980s to 1 percent in the 1990s), the MENA region is, for the second decade, 
the slowest growing region in the world (see Dasgupta, Keller, and Srinivasan, 2002).   
 
More precisely, in this paper, we try to understand whether the growth performance of the region has 
been disappointing because MENA economies have lagged behind in terms of reforms, or because the growth 
dividend of the reforms has been small. We illustrate that both explanations are relevant. On the one hand, 
economic reforms have been insufficient to boost the growth performance of the countries. This is the case for 
macroeconomic reforms during the 1980s, and for structural reforms during the entire period. On the other 
hand, our estimations reveal a low impact of some economic reforms. This is the case when structural reforms 
are implemented in a volatile macroeconomic environment, and when macroeconomic reforms are implemented 
without a sufficient level of structural reforms, as in MENA for both decades. Our result illustrates the 
complementarities between the economic reforms as elaborated by Mussa (1987) and by Williamson (1994). 
 
A first critical step in our exercise has been to measure the economic reform effort of the countries, 
using indicators that are as close as possible to reform policies and instruments.
1 The originality of our 
approach, however, has consisted in generating aggregated reform indicators using principal component 
analysis. This methodology permits the aggregation of basic indicators in a more rigorous way than would a 
subjective scoring system (see, for example, the rating system elaborated by the International Country Risk 
Guide, ICRG). It also avoids multi-collinearity problems when estimating an equation that includes several 
disaggregated indicators.  
 
In this sense, our findings bring new empirical evidence to the subject of economic policy and 
economic growth, since no work, to our knowledge, has previously been undertaken using this methodology in 
the MENA region. Furthermore, the use of panel data estimation techniques has allowed some comparative 
analysis among the different regions, as well as among the MENA countries.
2 In addition to economic reforms, 
the link of human capital and physical infrastructure to economic growth has been discussed in this paper. 
                                                           
1 The outcome measure  such as the rate of inflation, the external debt, the public deficit, or trade openness (Easterly et 
al, 1997)  is the most popular way to evaluate economic reforms. In this case, however, the indicators used cannot be 
considered only as reform inputs, but also as consequences of reforms and other factors. This method nevertheless 
constitutes an improvement over earlier methods, which distinguished only between the presence or absence of reforms, 
and therefore failed to capture the gradation in reform intensity across the countries. A better approach would be to directly 
measure reform inputs. This method could not be used here because of the lack of data. 
 
2 The comparative advantage of panel data regressions compared to time series estimation techniques can also be seen in: 
a - The double dimension (time series - cross section), which improves estimates by adding information;  
b - The country dummy variables, which generally ask for an important number of degree of freedom, and which add 
precision to the results of the estimations.   5
 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section presents the principal component analysis of the 
economic reforms, human capital, and physical infrastructure indicators. Our analysis is based on a panel of 44 
developing countries over 1970-80 to 1999.
3  In the third section, we discuss, in a comparative perspective, the 
progress of reforms in the MENA economies, as well as their development in the areas of human capital and 
core infrastructure. In the fourth section, we estimate a growth equation that includes our different composite 
indicators. We verify that economic reforms, human capital, and physical infrastructure have had a positive 
influence on the growth pattern of our sample of countries. The fifth section quantifies the contribution of 
reforms, human capital, and physical infrastructure to the economic growth of the MENA region. We illustrate 
that the lack of reforms has had a negative influence on the growth accomplishment of these economies. The 
last section concludes. 
 
2.  Indicators of Economic Reforms, Human Capital, and Physical Infrastructure 
 
MENA countries differ considerably among themselves, as well as with regard to the rest of the world, 
in terms of resources endowment and structures of production, and also in terms of economic reforms, physical 
infrastructure, and human capital. These differences have been assessed using various economic, physical, and 
social indicators that have been aggregated by means of principal component analysis. This method  applied 
by Nagaraj, Varoudakis and Véganzonès (2000)  has been used to generate five aggregate indicators.
4  
 
  The first composite indicator, macroeconomic stability (MS), is based on:  
 
•  inflation (p) and public deficit as percentage of GDP (PubDef), which can be disruptive to 
investment and growth if they lead to unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances (see Fischer, 1993; 
De Gregorio, 1992);  and 
 
•  foreign exchange parallel market’s premium (lBmp, in logarithm) as a proxy of various distortions 
in the economy that can also lead to macroeconomic instability.
5 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
3 Among these countries, 16 are African countries (7 CFA and 9 non-CFA), 12 are Latin American countries, 9 are Asian 
countries, and 7 are MENA countries (see Annex 1 for the list of countries). These economies have been selected based on 
their level of income per capita. To preserve the coherence of the sample, we have chosen mostly intermediate-income 
countries that are comparable with the economies of the MENA region.  
 
 
4 Another possibility could have been to use existing composite reform indicators. The rating system elaborated by the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) could have presented some interest. Three types of indicators are available from 
1984 to 1999:  
a- an economic risk indicator, composed of 5 basic indicators: GDP per capita, Real GDP growth rate, annual 
inflation, budget as well as current account balance as a percentage of GDP.  
 
b- a financial risk indicator, elaborated from 5 other basic indexes: foreign debt as percentage of GDP, exports of 
goods and services, current account balance as percentage of exports of goods and services, net international liquidity 
as months of imports cover, exchange rate stability.  
 
c- a political risk indicator, composed of 12 different political indexes.  
 
However because of (a) some disagreement regarding the choice of some basic indicators; (b) the short time period of 
availability of the series; and (c) the subjectivity attached to the aggregation of the initial indicators, we decided not to use 
these indexes, but instead to elaborate our own series.  
 
5 The Bmp indicator is traditionally a measure of the distortions on the capital markets, which can hinder the mobilization 
of resources for investing, especially in tradable goods. This indicator is also used as a proxy for real exchange rate (RER) 
misalignment, and particularly for RER overvaluation. In fact, many governments, to ration scarce foreign exchange to the 
private sector, use exchange controls. The excess of foreign exchange demand arising from the official exchange rate being 
kept below its market clearing level, leads to an overvaluation of the currency (see Pinto, 1990, for an analysis of the 
various foreign exchange market’s distortions captured by Bmp).  
  6
 
The second composite indicator, external stability (ES), is represented by: 
 
•  external debt as percentage of GNI (DebExGni), as well as of exports of goods and services 
(DebExX), which represent the risk to an economy of encountering difficulties in reimbursing its 
debt and facing a financial crisis; and  
 
•  current account in percentage of exports of goods and services (CurAcX), which gives another 
signal of the fragility of the external position of the country.  
 
  The third composite indicator, structural reforms (SR), embodies:  
 
•  an indicator of trade policy (TradeP), calculated as the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, from 
which we have deducted the “natural trade openness” of the economies calculated by Frankel and 
Romer (1999),
6 as well as the exports of oil and mining products, which introduce a bias in the 
sample due to natural resource endowment.  This indicator is based on the fact that trade reforms 
can be at the origin of economies of scale and of productivity gains, due to increased 
competitiveness and increased access to larger markets (Balassa, 1978;  Feder, 1982); and  
 
•  private credit by deposit money banks and other institutions (in percentage of GDP, PCrBOG), as a 
proxy for the development of the banking system, which can have a positive effect on productivity 
due to a better selection of investment projects and to higher technological specialization through a 
diversification of risks (see Levine, 1997, for a synthesis).  
 
  The fourth composite indicator, human capital (MH1), is represented by the logarithm of:  
 
•  the infant mortality rate (lMort) as a proxy of the health conditions of the population; and 
•  the number of years of primary schooling of the population (lH1).  
 
Both health and education increase the productivity of physical capital and can be at the origin of 
positive externalities (Lucas, 1988; Psacharopoulos, 1988; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992).
7 
 
The fifth composite indicator, physical infrastructure (Phys), is based on the logarithm of: 
 
•  the density of the road network (lRoads,  in km per km2); and  
•  the number of telephone lines per 1000 people (lTel ).  
 
  The complementarities among physical infrastructure and physical and human capital lead to higher 
productivity and increase the incentive to invest (see Barro, 1990 ; Aschauer, 1989 ; Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1989).  
 
  The principal components of these twelve basic indicators
8 were extracted for each group of 
indicators from an annual panel of 44 countries over 1970-80 to 1999.
9 The five composite indicators were then 
                                                           
6 The “natural openness” of the economy is calculated by Frankel and Romer (1999) by taking into account the size and the 
distance of the markets of the countries concerned.  
 
7 We have also processed a more completed human capital indicator (H) that includes, as well, secondary and superior 
schooling (see Annex 2, Table A2.4.a). This indicator does not give better results when estimating the growth equation. We 
will, however will give some details on the outcomes in secondary and superior education in Annex 6. 
 
8 Fourteen in the case of the more complete human capital indicator (H, see Annex 6).  
 
9 As part of our empirical work, we have tried, without success, to introduce in the principal component analysis the ratio 
of current account balance to GDP as a component of the macroeconomic stability index, the exchange rate stability as part  7
constructed as the weighted sum of one or two principal components, depending of the explanatory power of 
each component. We chose the most significant principal components whose eighenvalues were higher than 
one. In this case, we explain around 70 percent of the variance of the underlying individual indicators (see 
Tables A2.1 to A2.5 in Appendix 2). The weight attributed to each principal component corresponds to its 
relative contribution to the variance of the initial indicators (calculated from the cumulative R²).
10 The 
contribution of each individual indicator to the composite indicator can then be computed as a linear 
combination of the weights associated with the one or two principal components and of the loadings of the 
individual indicators on each principal component (see Appendix 11). The calculations show that all initial 
indicators contribute as expected to the composite indicators.
11  
 
3.  Reforms in the MENA Countries 
 
  In this section, we analyze global performance in the areas of economic reform, human capital, 
and physical infrastructure in the five regions of our sample (MENA, Latin America, Asia, CFA Africa, and 
non-CFA Africa). We also analyze the performance of the seven MENA economies (the initial reform 
indicators are discussed in anexes 3 through 7). The MENA countries differed both among themselves and 
compared to the rest of the world. The main results of our analysis are discussed below.  
 
  3.1.  Macroeconomic Reforms 
 
  With regard to macroeconomic reforms, some progress was made in the 1990s compared to the 
1980s, when economies faced great instability. Most MENA countries adopted better macroeconomic policies, 
some in the late 1980s (Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan) and others in the 1990s, after a decade of regression 
(Iran, Syria, Algeria, Egypt; see Charts 1.1 and 1.2).
12,13 In the 1990s, some MENA countries  (Morocco, 
Tunisia Jordan, and Egypt) undertook a level of macroeconomic reforms similar to the average of the South and 
East Asian economies.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
of the external stability, the cumulated privatization receipts as a factor in the structural reforms, and the real exchange rate 
misalignment (see Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis, 2002). Other interesting indicators had to be ignored because of the 
lack of information. This has been the case with the ratio M2 to GDP, the import cover of international reserves, the ratio 
of short-term to total debt, as well as the net international liquidity as months of import cover, which could have reinforced 
the external stability index.  Similarly, our structural reform index could not benefit from information on mean tariff rates, 
or highest marginal individual and corporate taxes.  
 
10 In the case of macroeconomic stability, the first component is weighted by 40/72 and the second by (72-40)/72 (see 
Appendix 2 Table A2.1), where 40 is the explanatory power of the first principal component and (72-40) the explanatory 
power of the second one. These coefficients are normalized by dividing by 72, which corresponds to the percentage of the 
variance of the initial indicators explained by the two principal components selected.  
 
11 For a better reading of the graphs and the composite indicators, we have inverted the sign of the macroeconomic and 
external stability indexes. They can be interpreted now as the efforts to reform the economy.  The same thing has been 
done for the human capital indicator (see signs of the initial and composite indicators in Tables A2.1 to A2.5, Appendix 2) 
 
12  We have listed the MENA economies in a decreasing order of welfare. The first countries presented in the graphs are 
the ones which exhibited the higher GDP per capita in the 1970s.  
 
13 Due to the methodology of calculation of principal component analysis, the level and sign of the aggregate indicators 
have no particular interpretation.  These indicators have to be read as follows: 
  
a-  A rise in the indicator indicates a progress in reform. Conversely, a deterioration denotes a regression.   
b- The intensity of reforms is measured as the difference of the indicator across countries and between periods. 
 
In the last section, we will use the annual growth rate of the composite as well as of the initial indicators to measure their 
impact on growth.  
  8
In the 1990s, inflation was successfully contained (particularly in Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia; Chart 
2.2 in Annex 3).  The public deficit was reduced in all the countries (Chart 3.2 in Annex 3), and the foreign 
exchange parallel market premium was ended in the majority of the countries (Chart 4.2 in Annex 3). 
 
  Macroeconomic stability in the MENA region could, however, have been improved more 
compared to other regions – with the exception of Latin America, where stability was not achieved in the 1990s 
(see Chart 1.1). In Tunisia and Morocco, further progress would have reduced the public deficit, which has been 
higher than the MENA average (3.4 percent and 2.8 percent of GDP, on average, in the 1990s; see Charts 3.1 
and 3.2 in Annex 3). In Iran and Algeria, the black market exchange rate (due to capital controls and political 
instability) and inflation (which reached 20 percent in the 1990s) should have been better controlled (see Charts 
2.1, 4.1 and 2.2, 4.2 in Annex 3). This is also the case, to a lesser extent, for Syria’s foreign exchange parallel 
market premium and for Egypt’s inflation.  
 
  In fact, although macroeconomic policy has globally improved in MENA in the 1990s, efforts 













 Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
  3.2.   External Stability  
 
  In the area of external stability, the MENA countries in our sample performed rather poorly 
during the whole period, behind Latin America and Asia (see Chart 5.1).
14 This was largely due to the 
unsustainable level of foreign debt, which increased dramatically  in the 1980s (see Charts 6.1 and 7.1 in Annex 
4), because of the high public investment ratio of the 1970s and 1980s (see Annex 8). The exceptions were Iran, 














                                                           
14 These results are due partly to the exclusion of the Gulf economies, in which the average debt ratio has been lower. 
 
15 Iran could not find long-term loans in the international market. Algeria and Tunisia followed a more cautious policy. 
  9
 Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
  In the 1990s, the MENA countries’ external debt accounted for 60 to 70 percent of GNI in 
Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia (around 150 to 200 percent of exports), and more than 130 percent of GNI in 
Syria and Jordan (see Charts 6.2 and 7.2).
16  In the 1990s, Morocco and Egypt were the only two countries to 
reduce their external debt, following major debt forgiveness after the Gulf War.    
  
  This situation indicates that significant scope for debt reduction exists in the region. Debt 
reduction is a concern shared by the majority of MENA countries in our sample; however, Syria, Jordan and, to 
a lesser extent, Morocco need to make a greater effort.   
 
  These difficulties in reducing the external debt have been partly compensated by improvements 
in the current account balance.  In fact, MENA  countries are among the best performers from all regions in 
terms of debt reduction (see Chart 8.1 in Annex 4). Even if only a few MENA economies exhibited a positive 
balance in the 1990s – this was the case for Iran, Syria and Egypt – efforts to reduce deficits are noticeable in 
almost every MENA country (except in Jordan). 
 
3.3.   Structural Reforms 
 
  In terms of structural reforms, the MENA countries seem, at a first glance, to have performed 
relatively well compared to the rest of the world, and were only surpassed by the Asian economies (see Chart 
9.1). This result is largely due to the apparent high financial depth of the MENA economies. The ratio of private 
credit from the banking system and other institutions has averaged 35  percent during the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Financial depth has been particularly significant in Jordan and Tunisia (respectively 70 percent and 60 percent 
of GDP), but has improved almost everywhere  except in Egypt, Iran and Algeria in the 1990s (Chart 10.2 in 
Annex 5). This achievement has only been better in Asia, where the financial ratio reached, on average, 60 
percent in the 1990s (see Chart 10.1 in Annex 5). Financial development has, however, been weaker in Syria, 
Algeria, and, to a lesser extent, Iran and Egypt in the 1990s.  
  













  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
  Our findings do not mean that the MENA economies have benefited from a strong banking 
system or a developed financial sector. In fact, other studies highlight the deficiencies of the financial sector as 
an effective means of boosting the development of the private sector and the growth prospects of the region 
(Nabli, 2000). In this context, our results might be due to the fact that the proxy used (PCrBOG) was unable to 
capture either the quality of the banking system (which could be better analyzed through other specific 
indicators),
17 or the development of the financial markets (which have also been deficient in the MENA 
economies).  
                                                           
16 The case of Syria has to be treated with caution because of the Russian debt.  
 
17  These indicators could, for example, be the nature and the quality of the loans, the ratio of reserves of the banks, or the 
percentage of loans through private banks. If such indicators were taken into consideration, the picture of the banking  10
  
  Trade openness has often been particularly low – with a ratio, on average, of about 30 percent 
of GDP, compared to 45 to 70 percent in Asia
18 – and rather similar to that of Latin America (Chart 11.1 in 
Annex 5). This is the case despite some exports diversification of the non oil-producing countries in the 1990s, 
which explains why trade openness has been rather high in Jordan and Tunisia (around 60 percent of GDP, 
Chart 11.2 in Annex 5). These countries (with Morocco) have been the most diversified of the region (Table A-1 
in Annex 5). Trade openness has remained weak in Iran, Syria, and Algeria (between 10 percent and 20 percent 
of GDP in the 1990s) due to their difficulties in moving from oil production and State-dominated management 
of their economies.
19  In these countries, the scope for improvement of trade policy is still very significant.  
 
3.4.   Human Capital 
 
During the 1980s and the 1990s, MENA economies significantly improved their level of human capital. 
Good performances are noticeable throughout the region, and particularly in Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, and Iran 
(see Chart 12.2). If progress was one of the best across regions, however, the level of human capital in the 
1990s was still lower than in Asia and Latin America (see Chart 12.1). This means that there are still large 
potential gains from the development of human capital in the region.  
 
One important area of success has been the reduction of infant mortality. Mortality rates, which reached 
30 per 1000 in the 1990s, were cut by two-thirds compared to the 1970s. Levels are now in line with Asia and 
Latin America. The highest achiever was Egypt, where the ratio of infant mortality fell six-fold during the same 
period. Because of its high initial level, this ratio is, however, still above MENA average. Noticeable efforts in 













*This indicator includes infant mortality and primary schooling only.   
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
In the field of education, results have been mixed. Despite good progress, level of primary schooling 
has remained lower than in Asia, Latin America, and non-CFA Africa. Tunisia is the exception, with almost 5 
years of primary schooling in the 1990s. Successful achievements were also realized by Jordan, Algeria, Syria, 
and Iran (about 4 years of schooling (see Charts 14.1 and 14.2 in Annex 6.A).  On average, achievements were 
greater in secondary and superior education, where schooling was more in line with Asia and/or Latin America.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
system would be different, with, in particular, a not always healthy sector, a very present State, and a slow pace of 
privatization (specifically in Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Iran, Syria; see Nabli, 2000).  
 
18 Our trade openness indicator excludes the “natural” openness of the economy (see Frankel and Romer, 1999), as well as 
the exports of oil and mining products.  
 
19 Trade policy should, however, be analyzed through other indicators, such as average tariffs and non-tariff barriers, which 
are not available on an yearly basis for a large sample of countries. By using these kinds of indicators from the mid-1980s 
and for a smaller sample of countries, Dasgupta, Keller and Srinivasan, (2002) have shown that trade policy in MENA 
countries has historically been among the most restrictive in the world.  
  11
The performance of Syria, Iran, Jordan, and Egypt have been above the MENA average, with 1.5 to 2 years, 
and 0.6 years of schooling, respectively (but only 0.15 for superior education in the case of Iran, see Charts 
15.1 and 16.1 in Annex 6).  In summary, improvements are still needed in the field of education.   
 
  3.5.  Core Infrastructure  
 
Despite real progress throughout the period, MENA countries remain deficient in infrastructure.  Here, 
again, there are large differences among the countries. For example, Iran, Syria, Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, 
Morocco have shown better achievements than other MENA economies (almost in line with Latin America and 
Asia, see Charts 17.1 and 17.2).
20   
 
The road network, in particular, has been very insufficient, with a density as low as in CFA Africa. 
Although a majority of countries have progressively improved their road infrastructure, the level was still low 
in Jordan, Algeria, and Egypt in the 1990s. Better progress was made by Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Iran, 
where construction equipment was rather equivalent to that in Latin America (but lower than in Asia; see Charts 
18.1 and 18.2 in Annex 7).  
 
 The same observation can be made for the telephone network. Despite real improvements in almost all 
MENA countries, the level of equipment has remained deficient compared to Latin America and Asia (but far 
better than in Africa). Only Iran, Syria and Jordan have revealed a pattern similar to that in Latin America (see 
















 Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
  3.6.   Growth Performance of the MENA Countries  
 
Despite some progress in various areas of reform, MENA countries have revealed a rather disappointing 
pattern in term of economic growth. Growth performance in almost all MENA countries improved during the 
1990s, but GDP growth rates have been largely surpassed in the Asian economies (which reached 4 percent a 
year, on average, against 1.7 percent for the MENA countries; see Chart 20.1).  
 
Syria and Tunisia achieved the best results of the group, with the GDP per capita growth rate reaching 
respectively 3.5 percent and 4 percent in the 1990s.  Egypt and Iran follow with 2 percent increases. These 
results can be directly linked to the efforts of these countries in the areas of economic reforms, human capital, 
                                                           
20 The analysis is, however, restricted by our limited number of indicators; that is to say, the road network on one side, and 
the number of telephone lines per 1000 population on the other side. Results would also have been different if we had 
included the Gulf economies, as well as other oil producing countries in our sample.  
  12
and physical infrastructure. Tunisia has performed rather well in all these fields of reform. Iran and Syria have 
greatly improved their endowment in human capital and core infrastructure. In addition, Iran and Egypt have 
shown a modest debt burden in the 1990s. Egypt  has also made important progress in human capital 














  Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Outcomes are, however, poor in the cases of Jordan, Morocco (which has shown a clear decreasing 
trend across the period), and Algeria (which has been affected by the fall in oil prices and the political turmoil 
of the 1980s and 1990s; see Chart 20.2). Algeria has been characterized by significant macroeconomic 
instability, an insufficient trade openness, low financial development, and deficiencies in physical 
infrastructure. Jordan has suffered from a high debt ratio and insufficient endowment in infrastructure.  Despite 
a real effort to reform the economy, Morocco has still had to face high foreign debt, low financial development, 













 Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In fact, these low growth performances explain very well why our sample of MENA countries have 





4.  Economic Reforms, Human Capital, Physical Infrastructure, and Growth 
 
This section addresses the link between economic reforms and economic growth. For this purpose, we 
have estimated a conditional convergence equation [Equation (1)] inspired by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995).   13
 
In this equation, the long-run GDP per capita growth rate [∆ln(yi,t)] depends on the logarithm of the 
initial level of the GDP per capita [ln(yi,t-1)] – called the catch-up effect in the growth literature – as well as on 
other variables. These variables aim at explaining the differences across countries in the long-term level of GDP 
per capita. In our case, we have added – in addition to the ratio of investment to GDP, which represents the 
increase in the productive capacities of the economy – the composite economic reform indicators, as well as the 
physical infrastructure and human capital indicators.
21,22:  
 
∆ln(y i,t) = c +  a*ln(y i,t -1) + b*l.ln(Inv i,t) + d1* (MSi,t) + d2*(ESi,t) + d3 *(SRi,t) 
 
+ e1*(Physi,t) + e2*(MH1i,t)            ( 1 )  
 
with: - y i,t –1 = GDP per capita of the previous period 
 
  - Inv i,t = investment ratio to GDP 
 
  - MSi,, t = macroeconomic stability indicator 
 
  - ESi,,t = external stability indicator 
 
  - SRi,,t = structural reform indicator 
 
  - Physi,,t = physical infrastructures indicator 
 
  - MH1i,t = human capital indicator 
 
  - c = intercept, a, b, d1 to d3, e1 to e2, = parameters, t = time index and εt = error term. 
 
A variant of this equation has consisted in introducing two multiplicative terms (MS*SR and ES*SR) to 
capture the possible complementarities among reforms [Equation (2)]. This case has been developed by Mussa 
(1987) and Williamson (1994), who have elaborated the idea that structural reforms are not efficient if the 
economy is not stabilized and/or if the external situation of the country is fragile. The multiplicative term also 
allows for capture of the reverse effect: the efficiency of external and macroeconomic stability increases with 
the level of structural reforms. This could be relevant to the MENA economies which reforms in some domains 
have been insufficient. 
 
∆ln(y i,t) = c +  a*ln(y i,t -1) + b*l.ln(Inv i,t) + d1* (MSi,t) + d2*(ESi,t) + d3 *(SRi,t) +  
 
d4*( MSi,t* SRi,tt) + d5 *( ESi,t* SRi,t) + e1*(Physi,t) + e2*( MH1i,t)       (2) 
 
                                                           
21 It is worth noting that the reduced form used here – which includes the ratio of investment to GDP – is derived from a 
log-linear approximation around the steady state of a Solow (1967) type growth model. This model has been extended by 
several authors by incorporating other explanatory variables in order to better explain the residual of the equation (called 
technical progress – see Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992 – as far as human capital is concerned). In this paper, we have 
chosen the same approach and have introduced our reform indicators. We should, however, point out that reforms also 
materialize into growth by increasing the investment ratio. This should be kept in mind when analyzing our estimation 
results, which, in this context, may have underestimated the impact of reforms on growth.  
 
22 This method, consisting in directly introducing the initial reform indicators into the regressions, has been tried with less 
success. Because of the correlation of the disaggregated variables, the significance of some of the variables turned out to 
depend on  the specification of the model. These initial tests have not been reported here because of the large number of 
combinations.  
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  The existence of these two long-term relationships implies that variables of Equations (1) and 
(2) are cointegrated. We therefore determined the order of integration of the series. Table A5-1 in Annex 9 
provides the results of the Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests of the data for our sample of countries from 
1970-80 to 1999. We used the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1997) methodology, which provides critical values of 
ADF tests in the case of heterogeneous panel data. The results indicate that series are generally stationary at the 




Hence,  Equations (1) and (2) describe the long-run relationship between growth and a number of 
economic reforms, human capital, and physical infrastructure indicators. Equations  (1) and (2) have been 
estimated on our unbalanced panel of 44 developing countries. The results of the regressions –  using the White 
estimator to correct for the heteroscedasticity bias – are presented in Table 1. To control for the sample 
heterogeneity, we have introduced country dummy variables. These variables reflect differences in the quality 
of institutions or the different endowment in natural resources,
24 which can be at the origin of large 
discrepancies in the “natural propensity” to grow.
25  
 
Estimated relationships between GDP per capita growth rates and the various independent variables are 
consistent with the theory. Increases in the investment ratio, in macroeconomic and external stability, in 
structural reforms, in physical infrastructure, and in human capital lead to higher growth rates.
26  
 
The impact of most variables on growth is, however, not instantaneous. This is the case with 
macroeconomic and external stability, as well as structural reforms (respectively one and two lags). This means 
that structural reforms need some time (two years, according to our estimations) to materialize into growth. As 
expected, the effects of macroeconomic and external reforms are faster (one year).  The same conclusions can 
be drawn for human capital and physical infrastructure (no lag and two lags respectively).
27  
 
  Another interesting feature can be drawn from the estimation of Equation (2), which 
corroborates the sequencing of reforms developed by Mussa (1987) and Williamson (1994). When introducing 
the multiplicative term MS*SR (macroeconomic multiplied by structural reforms), it turns out to be significant, 
while the structural reforms indicator alone (SR) is no longer significant (see Table 1). This result highlights the 
complementarity between macroeconomic stability and structural reforms.  
 
On one side, the efficiency of structural reforms depends on success in stabilizing the economy.  In an 
increasingly volatile environment, a high level of structural reforms increases the disruptive effect of 
macroeconomic instability. This means that structural reforms should take place at least at the same time as 
macroeconomic reforms, if not before.  
                                                           
23 This is also the case because our sample is sufficiently “big” with T (number of time periods) and N (number of 
countries) being large enough (see Im, Pesaran, and Shin, 1997). In this case, despite the presence of the lag variable y-1, 
which is correlated with the constant terms, the distributions of the tests tend to converge.  
 
24 This applies in particular to the oil-producing  and mining economies in our sample. 
 
25 This hypothesis is supported by the data, as shown by the value of the Fischer tests of equality of the intercepts across 
countries, as well as by the value of the Hausman tests as far as the random hypothesis is concerned (Table 1). Other 
estimations have consisted in testing the heterogeneity of the estimated relationship across regions, using the Gauss 
software. In particular, we have tested – without any success – the difference of slope of the economic reforms, human 
capital, and physical infrastructure indicators.   
 
26 Macroeconomic stability in Equation (1), and human capital in Equations (1) and (2) are significant at 10 percent level.  
 
27 In addition of the economic interpretation, the introduction of the lag reform variables has the interest of correcting for 
the potential bias linked to the endogeneity of the right hand variables. In this case, the reverse causality that might exist is 
not supposed to interact with and bias the value of the estimated coefficients.   15
 
Table 1: Estimation Results of the Long Term Growth Equations (1) and (2) 
Dependent Variable  ∆ln(yt) 
 
  Independent Variables  Eq1 Eq2 
  ln(yt-1 )  -0.17  -0.17 
   (8.62)  (8.96) 
  In(invt) 0.065  0.066 
   (5.27)  (5.38) 
  MSt 
(1)  0.004* 0.028 
   (1.76)  (2.76) 
  ESt 
(1)  0.03 0.027 
   (5.  3)  (3.95) 
  SRt 
(2)  0.015 0.011** 
   (2.05)  (1.56) 
  MSt 
(1) * SRt 
(2)   0.027 
      (2.65) 
  ESt 
(1) *  SRt 
(2)   0.006** 
      (0.69) 
  Physt 
(2)  0.03   0.031  
   (2.07)  (2.07) 
  MH1t  0.018 * 0.016  * 
   (1.70)  (1.66) 
      
  Adjusted R²  0.29  0.30 
  Fischer test  4.1  4.3 
  Hausman test  56.2  67.0 
Note: Student t statistics are within brackets. The number of observations used in the regressions is 589. Data  
have been compiled from World Development Indicators (WDI), Global Development Finance (GDF), Global 
Development Network  (GDN), and Live Data Base (LDB) (World Bank).   
(1): one lag ; (2): two lags ; (*):  significant at 10  percent level ; (**):  not significant .  
Source: Authors’ estimations  
 
On the other side, the opposite is partially true.  If stabilization programs are more successful when 
structural reforms are undertaken, and if the growth outcome of the macroeconomic stabilization is linked to the 
level of structural reforms (through the multiplicative term MS*SR), macroeconomic reform materialized into 
growth even in the absence of structural reforms (through the MS index alone). This stresses the importance of 
macroeconomic reforms for the growth prospects and the reform process of the countries.  
 
Estimation of Equation (2) also reveals in another way the critical role of macroeconomic stability for 
the growth prospects of the economies. In fact, the coefficient of the macroeconomic reforms index alone in 
Equation (2) is higher and more significant than when estimating Equation (1) (see Table 1). In addition, the 
coefficient of the multiplicative term is of the same magnitude as that of the macroeconomic reforms index 
alone. This means that both effects are similarly significant. This will be illustrated in the next section, when 
calculating the contribution of each reform indicator to the economic growth of our sample of countries.  
 
Finally, the robustness of our estimations can be evaluated by the fact that coefficients other than 
macroeconomic stability and structural reforms are similar in both estimations (see Equations (1) and (2)).  In 
the rest of this document, we will focus on the results of Equation (2), which gives a more complete picture of 
the relation between reform and growth.  
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5.   Assessing the Impact of Economic Reform, Human Capital, and Physical Infrastructure on 
the Long-Run Growth Performance of the MENA Countries  
 
As noted above, the use of aggregate indicators of economic reform, human capital, and physical 
infrastructure overcomes the difficulties of estimating the impact of a large number of indicators that may have 
collinear relationships. This method allows, in addition, for subsequent calculations of the contribution of the 
initial indicators to the growth performance of the countries. The calculation is based on the estimated 
coefficients of the aggregate indicators in the regression, as well as on the weights of each principal component 
in the aggregate indicator combined with the loadings of the initial variables in each principal component (see 
Annex 10 for more details on the methodology). 
 
  5.1.   Physical Infrastructure and Human Capital  
 
Table 2 shows our estimates of the long-term coefficients/elasticities of the initial reform indicators (see 
Tables A11-1 and A11-2 in Annex 11 for the short-term coefficients/elasticites). A number of conclusions can 
be drawn from these calculations.  
 
First, improvements in human capital and physical infrastructure present a strong and approximately 
equal potential impact on growth.  In both equations, primary education, along with the road network and the 
health conditions of the population, show the strongest elasticities. These variables appear to be key factors for 
the economic growth of our sample of countries. Although studies of the impact of core infrastructure on the 
growth performance of the economies rarely use physical indicators (such as the road or the telephone 
network),
28 our results are quite in line with the findings of some authors who have followed the same 
approach. Comparisons among studies are also difficult because of the differences of indicators and/or of 
specifications used.
29  
                                                           
28 Most of them employ aggregated indicators such as public investment. 
 
29 As far as the road network is concerned, Pouliquen (2000) – in his study of Indian infrastructure at the village level – 
found a short-term elasticity of 0.07 for the 1971-1981 period (here 0.03).  Nagaraj, Varoudakis and Véganzonès (2000) 
obtained an elasticity of 0.05 at the Indian States level studied from 1970 to 1994, and Véganzonès (2001) found an 
elasticity of  0.06 for a panel of 87 countries during 1970-1995. Conversely, Nagaraj, Varoudakis and Véganzonès (2000) 
have come out with a long-term elasticity of 0.34 and Véganzonès (2001) of 0.16 (here 0.15).  
 
The impact of the development of the telephone network has been evaluated by, among others, Canning (1999) for a large 
sample of countries during 1965-1990, using cross-countries regressions. Canning has estimated a short-term elasticity of 
0.013 (here 0.019) and a long-term elasticity of 0.15 (here 0.10). Véganzonès (2001) has obtained a short-term elasticity of 
0.007 and a long-term one of  0.18.  
 
As far as education is concerned, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) have estimated cross-countries regressions for the 1965-
1985 period. They have obtained a short-term elasticity of 0.01 for total education (here 0.025 for primary education) and a 
long term one of 0.04 (here 0.14). Véganzonès (2001) has found a short term elasticity of 0.01 for primary education and a 
long term one of 0.19.   
 
Infant mortality is an indicator rarely used in the growth literature, which focuses more on life expectancy. Nagaraj, 
Varoudakis, and Véganzonès (2000) have estimated a short-term elasticity of - 0.06 (here - 0.02) and a long-term elasticity   
of - 0.38 (here - 0.12). Véganzonès (2001) has obtained a short-term elasticity of - 0.02 and a long-term one of - 0.37.  
 
Our comparisons are constrained by the indicators and/or specifications chosen. Other close interesting results can be 
found, for example, in Grace and others (2001), Bougheas, Demetriades and Mamuneas (2000), and Easterly and Levine 
(1997 and 2000).  
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Table 2: Economic Policy and Infrastructure Variables 
Long-Term Coefficients/Elasticities 
 
 Index  Variables  Equation (1)  Equation (2) 
 P -0.004 -0.025 




PubDef   -0.056 -0.443 
 DebExX  -0.101 -0.089 
 DebExGni  -0.003 -0.003 
 
ES 
CurAccX  0.453 0.396 




PCRBOG  0.363  0.252 * 
  ln(Roads)  0.149 0.145 
 
Phys 
ln(Tel)  0.106 0.104 
  ln(Mort)   -0.147 -0.123 
 
MH1 
ln(H1)   0.169 0.142 
* not significant.   
Source : Authors’ calculations. 
 
  In light of these results, achievements in human capital have constituted a clear engine of growth for 
our sample of MENA countries. As shown in Section 3.4, the MENA region has developed the level of 
education and the health conditions of its population to a large degree. It can be calculated from the long-term 
elasticities presented in Table 2, that improvement in primary schooling contributed an annual average of 0.3 to 
0.4 points of GDP per capita growth rate in the 1980s and 1990s. For the amelioration of poor health conditions, 
the contribution is even higher due to more significant progress than in primary schooling; i.e., 0.8 and 0.5 
points for each sub-period.  
 
Globally, improvements in human capital have explained between 0.9 and 1.1 points of growth per 
capita per year since the beginning of the 1980s. This means that, without progress in human capital, GDP per 
capita annual growth rate would have been -1.1 percent in the 1980s (instead of 0 percent) and 0.8 percent in 
the 1990s (instead of 1.7 percent; see Table 3.1). This contribution is even higher in the case of Iran, Syria, and 
Algeria, due to the initial gap in primary schooling compared to other more advanced MENA countries (1.2 to 
1.3 in the 1980s and 0.9 to 1.2 in the 1990s; see Table A12-5 in Annex 12). 
                                                           
30 In Equation (2), macroeconomic reforms impact growth through two channels: one is direct; the other one depends on 
the level of structural reforms. Elasticities/coefficients could not been calculated in this last case, due to the difficulties 
linked to the multiplicative term (MS*SR). Nevertheless, the global impact of macroeconomic reforms will be assessed for 
our different countries/groups of countries through their contribution to growth (see below in this section 5).  
 
31 The impact of structural reforms in Equation (2) depends on the level of macroeconomic reforms. Consequently, due to 
the multiplicative term, coefficients of the structural reform variables will not appear here. As for macroeconomic stability, 
their impact will be calculated for the different regions/countries through their contribution to growth.  
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Table 3: Contribution of Reforms to the Growth Performance of the MENA Countries 
 
3.1  The Impact of Human Capital  
                   
  MENA   %  Primary  Health  Contribution of  Growth of GDP 
  Years   Education   Mortality  Human Capital  per Capita  
  1980-89  Annual   2.8 -6.3    0 
  1990-99  Growth Rate  2.3 -4.5    1.7 
    LT Elasticity  0.14  -0.12  Total  Without H 
  1980-89   Contribution  0.4 0.8  1.1  -1.1 
  1990-99  to Growth   0.3 0.5  0.9  0.8 
 
   Years  MENA  Asia  LA  ACFA  ANCFA 
   1980-89  1.1  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.6 
   1990-99  0.9  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.4 
  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The contribution of infrastructure to growth also appears to be substantial, despite a relatively low level 
of equipment in our sample of MENA countries (see Section 3.5). This is due mainly to the rapid increase in the 
number of telephone lines, which annually has accounted for 0.7 points of the GDP per capita growth rate.
32 
Globally, from the beginning of the 1980s, physical infrastructure has annually contributed from 1.0 to 1.4 
points of the GDP per capita growth rate (see Table 3.2). This contribution has even been higher in Iran and 
Syria (around 1.8 and 1.5 respectively; see Table A12-5 in Annex 12).  
 
3.2  Impact of Physical Infrastructure  
                   
  MENA   % Tel  Roads  Contribution  Growth of GDP 
  Years   Lines  Network  of Infrastructure per Capita  
  1980-89  Annual   7.2 3.0    0 
  1990-99  Growth Rate  7.5 1.8    1.7 
    LT Elasticity  0.10  0.15  Total  Without Phy 
  1980-89   Contribution  0.8 0.6  1.4  -1.4 
  1990-99  to Growth   0.8 0.3  1.0  0.7 
 
      Years  MENA  Asia  LA  ACFA  ANCFA 
      1980-89  1.4  1.5  0.9  0.4  0.6 
      1990-99  1.0  1.1  0.8  0.9  0.8 
  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
This results implies that – due to the gap between MENA and other more advanced regions (Asia 
and/or Latin America) – the construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure can be seen (along with primary 
schooling) as an important potential source of growth for the MENA region.  
 
The importance of human capital and physical infrastructure for the growth experience of the other 
regions is illustrated in tables 2.1 and 2.2. The rapid progression of the health conditions in MENA accounts for 
a higher contribution of human capital in that region than in other regions. However, this shows MENA’s lag 
with regard to education and infrastructure compared to the other regions.   
                                                           
32 The strong impact of the amelioration of the telephone network – which is, however, in line with the finding of other 
studies – might also be explained by the fact that this indicator, along with the road network, might also capture the impact 
of other infrastructures.   
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  5.2.   Macroeconomic Stability and Structural Reforms 
 
Our calculations stress the significance of macroeconomic stability for the growth prospects of our 
economies. This result is confirmed by the experience of all the regions in our sample. As noted above, one part 
of this effect is direct, and the other part depends on the level of structural reforms. Table 3.3 summarizes these 
two effects, from which several conclusions can be drawn.
33 
 
During the 1980s, the macroeconomic volatility of MENA was disruptive to growth, due mainly to the 
sharp increase of the foreign exchange parallel market premium in some MENA countries (Iran, Algeria, and 
Syria).
34  Inflation and public deficit increased moderately but stayed at a relatively high level (especially in 
Iran and Syria, as well as in Algeria for inflation). Both the direct and indirect effects contributed negatively 
and with the same magnitude to growth (-0.6 to -0.7 points per year of GDP per capita growth, for a total of -1.3 
points). This means that the negative effect of macroeconomic instability (essentially the black market 
premium) more than compensated for the positive impact of human capital or physical infrastructure (see 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2). This negative contribution was even higher in Iran and Syria (-2.6 and -2.4, respectively)  
 
This finding stresses the importance of macroeconomic stability for the growth accomplishment of our 
economies, which is also illustrated by the experience of other regions in our sample. Inflation and public 
deficit in Latin America, and the public deficit and foreign exchange parallel market premiums in non CFA 
Africa, have contributed to the economic turmoil in these regions (-1.4 to -0.3 points, respectively, of the GDP 
per capita growth rate; see Table 3.3 and charts 2.1 to 4.1 in Annex 3).  
 
In the 1990s, this result was reversed, and stabilization in our sample of MENA economies contributed 
positively to the region’s growth performance.. Progress – which essentially concerned public deficit – could, 
however, has been more significant. The contribution of improved macroeconomic conditions reached only 0.4 




3.3   Impact of Macroeconomic Stability  
                    
MENA   %  p  bmp  PubDef  Contribution of  Growth of GDP 
Years        Macroeconomic Stability per Capita  
1980-89  Annual   0.4  22  0.03   0  
1990-99  Growth Rate  -0.2  2.6  -0.6   1.7 
  LTCoef/ Elasticity  -0.025  -0.029  -0.443  MS alone  With
** Without
*** MS 
1980-89   Contribution  -0.01  -0.6  -0.01  -0.7  0.7 
1990-99  to Growth   0.01  -0.1  0.26  0.2  1.5 
                                                           
33 As far as coefficients/elasticities are concerned, our results have also been compared to those of other studies. In the case 
of inflation, Barro (1996) – who studied a panel of 110 countries for 3 sub-periods between 1965 and 1990 – found a short- 
term coefficient of - 0.006 (here - 0.005). Guillaumont, Guillaumont-Jeanneney, and Varoudakis (1999) have estimated a 
short-term coefficient of - 0.006 and a long-term one of - .14 (here - 0.025) for a panel of 44 African countries studied on a 
5-year average basis during 1960-1995.  
 
In the case of public deficit, the same authors found a short-term coefficient of - 0.06 (here - 0.08) and a long-term one of  
- 0.14 (here - 0.43).  
 
For the black market exchange rate premium, Easterly and Levine (1993), as well as Easterly, Kremer, Prichet and 
Summer (1993), obtained a short-term coefficient of - 0.004 (here - 0.005) for a panel of 115 countries studied during the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.  
 
34 This indicator is considered here as a proxy of various distortions in the economy. 
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1980-89   Contribution  -0.01  -0.6  -0.01  -0.6  0.6 
1990-99  to Growth   0.01  -0.1  0.25  0.2  1.5 
           Total  With
** Without
***MS 
1980-89   Contribution  -0.02  -1.2  -0.03  -1.3  1.3 
1990-99  to Growth   0.01  -0.15  0.5  0.4  1.3 
* Without change in SR ** With MS in the case of a negative impact on growth *** Without MS in the case of a positive impact. 
 
    Years  MENA  Asia  LA  ACFA  ANCFA 
    1980-89  -1.3  0.1  -1.4  0.05  -0.3 
    1990-99  0.4  0.5  0.8  0.2  1.0 
  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
First, as noted in Section 3, the macroeconomic stability of the MENA economies, however successful, 
could have been further improved. This is the case with the foreign exchange parallel market premium in Iran, 
Algeria, and Syria; and, to a lesser extent, with inflation in Iran, Algeria, Egypt, Syria; and with public deficit 
in Tunisia and Morocco.  
 
Second, our analysis has shown that structural reforms in MENA have always lagged behind the 
experiences of the most dynamic region of our sample (Asia), particularly during the high level of reforms of 
the 1990s.  The slow pace of structural reform has been an important factor limiting the benefits of the 
macroeconomic stabilization. (The same conclusions can be drawn for CFA Africa; Table 3.3). The case of the 
MENA countries thus illustrates the complementarities between macroeconomic stability and structural 
reforms.  
 
Third, the rather satisfactory level of inflation in the 1990s (except in Iran and Algeria) shows that 
improvements in inflation does not constitute an important source of growth.
35 In Latin America and non CFA 
Africa, an increase in macroeconomic stability is a greater contributing factor to the growth outcome of the 
period (respectively 0.8 and 1 point of GDP per capita growth per year, on average; see Table 3.3).  
 
Consequently, the disappointing economic performances of our sample of MENA countries seems to be 
due, in the first instance, to a lack of reforms of their economies (macroeconomic in the 1980s, structural and to 
a lesser extent macroeconomic in the 1990s); as well as to the weak effect of macroeconomic reforms when 
undertaken in a context of few structural reforms. This confirms that both the macroeconomic stability and the 
structural reforms of the MENA region still have to progress  in order to catch up with Asia and  contribute to 
the growth prospects of the region.  
 
3.4- Impact of Structural Reforms  
(Structural Reforms *Macroeconomic Stability: SR*MS*) 
                 
MENA  % TradeP*MS
*PCrBOG*MS
* Contribution of  Growth of GDP 
Years       Structural  Reforms per  Capita   
1980-89  Annual   -0.1  0.8    0 
1990-99  Growth Rate  0.7  0.01    1.7 
  LT Coefficients  0.24  0.27  Total  Without SR 
1980-89   Contribution  -0.03  0.2  0.2  -0.3 
1990-99  to Growth   0.2  0.0  0.2 1.5 
                                                           
35 Our model does not capture the impact of some reforms through an increase of the investment ratio. This might explain 
the rather low impact of inflation and, to a lesser extent, of public deficit, both of which are expected to be disruptive to 
investment.   21
  *  Without change in macroeconomic reforms;  
 
       Years  MENA  Asia  LA  ACFA  ANCFA 
       1980-89  0.2  0.9  0.2  0.1  0.2 
       1990-99  0.2  0.7  0.3  -0.3  0.3 
  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Conversely, the contribution of structural reforms — 0.2 points of GDP per capita growth rate during 
the two sub-periods, despite a low level of reforms, as well as the macro instability of the 1980s, which has 
limited the impact of structural reforms on growth (see Table 3.4) — leads us to think that structural reforms are 
potentially a key factor in the growth prospects of the MENA  region. This is confirmed by the strong 
contribution of structural reforms to the growth performances of the Asian countries (0.7 to 0.9 points, see 
Table 3.4), as well as by the experience of Tunisia and Jordan (0.5 to 0.7 points, Table A12-4 in Annex 12). 
The important gap with Asia in this domain constitutes another important potential source of growth for the 
region.   
 
  5.3.   External Stability  
 
As far as external stability is concerned, the volatility of the 1980s strongly contributed to the economic 
turmoil of the period. The increase of the debt ratio related to the exports of goods and services (DebX) led, on 
average, to a deterioration of 1 point of the annual GDP per capita growth rate (see Table 3.5). This 
deterioration has been even stronger in Syria (2.4 points, Table A12-2 in Annex 12). Globally, unbalances in the 
field of external stability cost the MENA countries an average of   
1 point per year of GDP per capita growth rate. This means that the growth performance of the region could 
have reached 1 percent on average per year (instead of 0 percent).  
 
3.5- Impact of External Stability  
                      
  MENA  %  DebX  DebGNP  CurAcc  Contribution of  Growth of GDP
  Years          External Stability  per Capita  
  1980-89  Annual   9.9  3.8  -0.3    0 
  1990-99  Growth Rate  -1.8  1.4  2.1    1.7 
    LT Coefficients  -0.089  -0.003  0.396    With/Without ES
  1980-89   Contribution  -0.9  -0.01  -0.1  -1.0  1 
  1990-99  to Growth   0.2  -0.004  0.8  1.0  0.7 
 
   Years  MENA  Asia  LA  ACFA  ANCFA 
   1980-89  -1.0  0.2  -1.4  -1.0  -1.9 
   1990-99  1.0  0.5  0.9  -0.9  -0.2 
 Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
During the 1990s, the process of debt reduction contributed positively to the growth performance of the 
region (0.2 point per year of GDP per capita). This low contribution, however, and the gap with other regions 
(Asia in particular), indicate that this process represents an important potential source of growth.  
 
Special attention  needs to be drawn to the current account balance. The strong long-term coefficient 
potentially makes this variable a key factor that can lead to large variations in the rate of growth of the 
economies. This was the case in the 1990s, when improvement in the current account position contributed 
substantially to the growth performance of the region (0.8 point of GDP per capita growth rate). This 
improvement was even higher in Egypt (1.3 points) and Iran (1 point). During this period, in fact, MENA 
showed the best performance among the regions. Table 3.5 also confirms that external stability has constituted a 
key factor in explaining the growth achievement of all the regions of our sample.  
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 5.4.      Summary 
 
Table 3.6 summarizes the global impact of economic reforms, human capital, and physical 
infrastructure on the growth performance of our sample of countries. The macroeconomic and external 
instability of the 1980s participated strongly in the low growth of our MENA economies. These factors 
contributed to lowering the annual GDP growth rate by 2.2 points; i.e., growth could have reached 2.2 percent 
per year (instead of 0 percent) if no degradation of the macroeconomic and external conditions had occurred. 
This negative contribution has even been stronger in the case of Syria (-5.4 points) and Iran (-2.6 points for 
macroeconomic stability alone).  
 
As far as positive contributions are concerned, human capital, physical infrastructure, and, to a lesser 
extent, structural reforms contributed during the same period to a 2.7 point annual average of GDP per capita 
growth rate.  This positive influence more than compensated the negative impact of insufficient macroeconomic 
and external reforms. This positive contribution was even higher in the case of Tunisia, Iran (3.1 points) and 
Syria (2.8 points).  
 
3.6.  Summary 
 
    %  Contribution to growth     
   Years  MS+ES         H+Phy+SR  Investment Total 
   1980-89 -2.2  2.7  -0.3  0.1 
   1990-99 1.4  2.1  -0.1  3.4 
 
 Total contribution to growth  MENA  Asia  LA  ACFA  ANCFA 
  1980-89  0.1  3.6  -1.0  0.2  -1 
  1990-99  3.4  3.6  3.5  0.4  2.4 
  GDP per capita growth rate                
  1980-89  0  3.4  -0.8  -1.2  -0.9 
  1990-99  1.7  3.9  1.7  -0.8  0.9 
  Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
In the 1990s, economic reforms, human capital, and physical infrastructure together explain the 
improvement in the economic situation in our sample of MENA countries. Human capital and physical 
infrastructure still contributed the most (1.9 points of GDP per capita growth rate, compared to the observed 
rate of 1.7 percent),  followed by macroeconomic and external stability (1.4 points of GDP per capita growth 
rate).
36 This finding reflects the efforts of the MENA countries to reform their economies.  However, reforms 
have still lagged behind Asia and Latin America. Indeed, the low contribution of structural reforms, the still 
high debt ratio, the foreign exchange parallel market premium in some countries, and the low development of 
infrastructure and primary schooling compared to Asia and Latin America, highlight the urgent need to focus 
more on these fundamental reforms.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
  
Our empirical analysis has clearly revealed the importance of economic reforms, human capital, and 
physical infrastructure for the growth prospects of the economies. These factors have shown a strong effect on 
growth, and have contributed greatly to the growth process in our sample of MENA countries.  
 
                                                           
36 The relatively high potential growth of the 1990s (3.4 percent compared to 1.7 observed), contrary to the 1980s, shows 
that some adverse factors to growth have not been taken into consideration in our regressions. These factors could be, for 
example, political stability or the quality of institutions, which could have deteriorated in some countries such as Algeria, 
Iran, or even Egypt (see Table A12.7 in Annex 12).  
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Success in reducing infant mortality has been highlighted in most MENA economies; and progress in 
education has been almost of the same magnitude as in Asia and Latin America. Improvements in human 
capital have contributed to an average annual increase of 0.9 to 1.1 points of the GDP per capita growth rate. 
However, the level of education in MENA has remained lower than in Asia and Latin America. This gap 
represents a potential for growth, particularly in the context of economic diversification and integration with the 
world market (with the European Union, in particular).  A more qualified labor force will be needed to 
accompany the structural reforms of the economies and the growth prospect of the region. This is particularly 
the case for Morocco for primary education; and for Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia for secondary and tertiary 
education. Thus education should be an important factor in the reform agendas of the MENA economies.  
 
Even if infrastructure has not been sufficiently developed – the road network in particular is insufficient 
in Egypt, Algeria, and Jordan – good progress in the telephone network accounts for the high participation of 
physical infrastructure in the region’s economic accomplishments (the telephone network in Egypt, Algeria, and 
Morocco, however, has remained deficient). The contribution of infrastructure development to the GDP per 
capita growth rate has averaged 1 to 1.4 points per year. However, the availability of infrastructure has still 
been lower than in Asia and Latin America.  This factor, too, should not be neglected if the MENA region 
wants to increase its productivity gains and be able to compete internationally. 
 
Our analysis has also revealed the importance of macroeconomic reforms for the growth prospects of 
the economies. On one side, this effect is direct. On the other side, the absence of macroeconomic reforms 
hinders the positive impact of structural reforms on growth. This makes macroeconomic stability a key variable 
for the reform process and for the growth prospects of the developing world. Our findings illustrate the 
complementarities among these and other reforms, as elaborated by Mussa (1987) and Williamson (1994).  
 
 Most MENA countries undertook better macroeconomic policies beginning in the 1980s (Morocco, 
Tunisia, Jordan), or in the 1990s after a decade of regression (Iran, Syria, Algeria, Egypt).  However, the 
reforms have been insufficient if the region wants to compete with more successful economies, such as the 
Asian economies. The black market exchange rate premium has remained high in Algeria, Iran, and Syria.  In 
Algeria and Iran, inflation should have been better controlled. In Morocco and Tunisia, the public deficit could 
have been further reduced. However, any reduction of public spending should not be at the expense of the 
development of physical infrastructure, health, and education, all of which contribute to growth.  
 
In the 1980s, macroeconomic instability represented a high cost for the growth performance of the 
region and explained a shortfall of 1.3 points of the GDP per capita growth rate – half directly and half through 
the failure of structural reforms. This negative indirect impact of insufficient macroeconomic reforms needs to 
be stressed if the region wants to undertake successful structural reforms and compete with the fast-growing 
economies.   
 
In the present context of better macroeconomic stability, structural reforms should be deepened in order 
to strengthen and increase the achievements in the field of macroeconomic reforms. This is also the case 
because the contribution of structural reforms to the growth performance of the economies has been shown to 
be high. Efforts should be made toward opening trade – the level of commercial openness being one of the 
lowest among the regions. This is particularly the case for Iran, Syria, and Algeria, which have had difficulties 
diversifying from mainly oil production and the State-dominated management of their economies. 
Achievements are better in the non-oil-producing countries which have successfully diversified their exports 
(Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco).  Efforts toward developing the financial system have also to be made by Syria, 
Iran, Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt.  
 
Finally, in the field of external stability – even though sizeable efforts have been made in renegotiating 
the external debt – significant scope for debt reduction still exists in the region. This is particularly the case for 
Syria.  But efforts can also be made by Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, and Egypt. Our estimations show that this is 
one of the most important factors for the growth accomplishment of the economies, since the in-                                    
crease in the debt burden has, in the past, cost MENA countries nearly 
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List of countries in the sample 
 
MENA       AFRI CA  ASIA    LATIN  AMERICA
     CFA  Non CFA  
Algeria (DZA)  Burkina Faso (BFA)  Botswana (BWA) Bangladesh  (BGD)  Argentina (ARG) 
Egypt, Arab Rep. (EGY)   Cote d'Ivoire (CIV)  Ghana (GHA) Indonesia  (IDN)  Bolivia (BOL) 
Iran, Islamic Rep.(IRN)   Gabon (GAB)  Kenya (KEN) India  (IND)  Brazil (BRA) 
Jordan (JOR)   Cameroon (CMR)  Madagascar (MDG) Korea,  Rep.(KOR)   Chile (CHL) 
Morocco (MAR)   Gambia, The (GMB)  Mauritius (MUS) Sri  Lanka  (LKA)  Colombia (COL) 
Syrian Arab Republic (SYR)   Niger (NER)  Malawi (MWI) Malaysia  (MYS)  Costa Rica (CRI) 
Tunisia (TUN)   Togo (TGO)  Nigeria (NGA) Pakistan  (PAK)  Ecuador (ECU) 
     South Africa (ZAF) Philippines  (PHL)  Guatemala (GTM) 
   Zambia  (ZMB) Thailand  (THA)  Mexico (MEX) 
         Peru (PER) 
            Paraguay  (PRY) 
        Uruguay  (URY) 
         




Annex 2 : Principal Component Analysis 
 
Table A2.1 : Macroeconomic Stability Variables  
 
   Component Eigenvalue Cumulative  R
2  
   P1  1.19  0.40 
   P2  0.96  0.72 
   P3  0.85  1 
 
 
Loadings  P1 P2 P3 
P  0.48 0.86 0.19 
lBmp  0.72 -0.16 -0.68 
PubDef  -0.67 0.45 -0.60 
 
MS = 0.40/ 0.72*P1 + (0.72-0.40)/ 0.72*P2 
 
****************************************************************************** 
Table A2.2: External Stability Variables  
 
   Component Eigenvalue Cumulative  R
2  
   P1  1.92  0.65 
   P2  0.81  0.92 
   P3  0.25  1 
 
 
Loadings  P1 P2 P3 
DebExX  0.92 0.03 0.37 
DebExGni  0.76 0.60 -0.26 
CurAccX  -0.71 0.67 0.21 
 
ES = P1  
****************************************************************************** 
 
Table A2.3: Structural Reform Variables 
 
   Component Eigenvalue Cumulative  R
2  
   P1  1.49  0.75 
   P2  0.51  1 
 
 
Loadings  P1 P2 
TradeP1  0.86 0.50 
PCRBOG  0.86 -0.50 
 
SR = P1 
 
**************************************************************************  29
Table A2.4.A: Human Capital Variables  
(complete) 
 
   Component Eigenvalue Cumulative  R
2  
   P1  2.95  0.74 
   P2  0.50  0.87 
   P3  0.34  0.95 
   P4  0.19  1 
 
 
Loadings  P1 P2 P3 P4 
ln(Mort)  0.79 0.59 0.15 0.08 
ln(H1)  -0.84 0.34 -0.43 0.04 
ln(H2)  -0.91 -0.005 0.26  0.32 
ln(H3)  -0.89 0.21 0.27 -0.29 
 
H = P1 
 
 
Table A2.4.B.: Human Capital Variables  
(reduced) 
 
   Component Eigenvalue Cumulative  R
2  
   P1  1.52  0.76 
   P2  0.48  1 
 
 
 Loadings  P1 P2 
 ln(Mort)  0.87 0.49 
 ln(H1)  -0.87 0.49 
 




Table A2.5: Physical Infrastructure Variables 
 
   Component Eigenvalue Cumulative  R
2  
   P1  1.42  0.71 
   P2  0.58  1 
 
 
Loadings  P1 P2 
ln(Roads)  0.84 0.54 
ln(Tel)  0.84 -0.54 
 
Phys = P1  30
Annex 3: Macroeconomic Stability Indicators 












Annex 4: External Stability Indicators  




















Annex 5: Structural Reform Indicators 


































Table A5-1: Average Manufactured Exports of Selected MENA Countries 
                                        
     Algeria  Egypt  Iran  Jordan  Morocco  Tunisia 
     %X  %GDP  %X  %GDP %X %GDP %X %GDP %X  %GDP  %X  %GDP 
  1970-79  3 0.6  27  3.1  2.9  0.6  26  1.9 16 2.1 24  4.6 
  1980-89  1.5  0.3  19  1.5  4.0  0.3  43  5.4 39 6.0 49  12 
   1990-99    3.3     0.8  37     2.4   6.6     1.5  49  9.5 53 7.5 75  21 
* For the 1st sub-period, four values were missing for Iran (1970, 1971, 1972  and 1973).  
** As far as the 3rd sub-period is concerned, two values were missing for Iran (1991 and 1992).  
and one for Jordan (1996).  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Annex 6: Human Capital Indicators 










Annex 7 : Physical Infrastructure Indicators 




























Total investment in the MENA countries of our sample has remained rather dynamic compared to the 
rest of the world during the whole period. At around 25 percent of GDP, total investment has been stronger than 
in Latin America and Africa, but inferior from the 1980s than in Asia (Chart 22.1). This result is due mainly to 
the high public investment ratio, private investment having, conversely, always been rather weak (Dasgupta, 
Keller and Srinivasan, 2002). 
 
In the 1970s, investment was particularly high in Egypt (more than 60 percent of GDP) and to a lesser 
extent, in Algeria and Jordan (35-40 percent of GDP). This situation can be explained by the abundance of 
liquidities due to the increase in oil revenues, workers’ remittances, and the abundance of foreign capital during 
this period.  During this time, many countries were able to improve their physical infrastructure and human 
capital. 
 
In the 1980s, because of the marked economic slow down, many MENA economies had to face an 
over-investment in a context of macroeconomic imbalances and a growing debt burden.
37 Total investment was 
still high  around 30 percent of GDP  in Algeria, Jordan, Egypt (Chart 22.2), and public investment was 
still more dynamic than private investment.  
 
During the 1990s, many MENA countries were able to adjust their public investment ratio with some 
success. Now total investment ranges from 20 to 30 percent of GDP. This has been done in a context of 
macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms. However, private investment remains low compared to the 
need for productivity gains of the MENA economies.  
 
 
                                                           
37  Tunisia and Morocco offer a clear example of this situation. Despite a sharp economic slow down during the 1980s, 
investment increased during the same period.   37
 




Table A9: Equations (1) and (2) 
 
 
Variable ADF  statistic 
                  k





Ln(y)  -3.22  1           yes  -1.82* I(0) 
        
Ln(Inv)  -3.12  1           no  -1.82*  I(0) 
        
MS  -3.19  1           no  -1.82* I(0) 
        
ES  -3.62  1           no  -1.82* I(0) 
         
SR  -1.86  1           no  -1.82*  I(0) 
         
MH1  -1.76  1           no  -1.73**  I(0) 
         
Phys  -6.58  1           no  -1.82*  I(0) 
        
 
(1) k  is the number of lags in the ADF test.  
(2) Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) critical values (respectively * 1% and ** 5% level).  
Data have been compiled from World Development Indicators (WDI), Global Development 




Annex 10: Methodology of Calculation of the Coefficient/Elasticities 




The impact of each type of indicator can be computed as follows: Let P be the vector (n*1) of the n 
principal components selected and δ the vector (1*n) of their weights in the aggregate indicator. Furthermore, 
the n principal components are expressed as a linear combination of initial variables such that P = AX, X being 
the vector (k*1) of k variables, and A represents the matrix (n*k) of loadings assigned to them. The composite 
indicator is expressed as: δ P  = δ  A X. Denoting by γ the estimated coefficient for this indicator, the 
convergence equation can be written: 
 
  t i t t i t i i t i t i u X A i y y , , 1 , , , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(
1 + + + − = −
− − η δ γ β α       (3) 
   
The vector (1*k) (E), expressing the impact on growth of the original variables, can be calculated such 
that E = γ δ A. These coefficients are estimated from Equations (1) and (2),  as well as from the loadings 
summarized in Appendix 2A to 2E. However, given the standardization procedure for the variables associated 
with the principal components method, the contribution of variations in level of each indicator to growth is 
expressed by the previously calculated coefficient (ei), divided by the standard deviation for each variable 
(ei/σi). The coefficients/elasticities of the long-run GDP per capita level with respect to different types of 
indicator is then obtained by dividing the impact coefficients by the convergence coefficient (β). Table 3 gives 
the long term coefficients/elasticities for each indicator (see also Table A-6 and A-7 in Annexes 10-A and 10-B 
for intermediate calculations)  39
Annex 11: Short and Long Term Coefficients/Elasticities  




Table A11-1. : Equation (1) 





Standardized Level  /Elasticities 
Index  Variables 
Variables Variables    
P  -0.0026 -0.0007  -0.004 
ln(Bmp)  -0.0013 -0.0007  -0.004 
MS 
PubDef   0.0006 0.0094  0.056 
              
DebExX  -0.027 -0.0172  -0.101 
DebExGni  -0.022 -0.0005  -0.003 
ES 
CurAccX  0.021 0.0770  0.453 
              
TradeP  0.013 0.0565  0.332  SR 
PCRBOG  0.013 0.0618  0.363 
              
ln(Roads)  0.025 0.0253  0.149 
ln(Tel)  0.025 0.0181  0.106 
Phys 
           
ln(Mort)   -0.0157 -0.0249  -0.147 
ln(H1)   0.0157 0.0287  0.169 
MH1 
           





Table A11-2 : Equation (2) 
          






  Standardized Level  /Elasticities 
 
Index  Variables 
Variables Variables    
  P  -0.0176 -0.0044 -0.026 
  ln(Bmp)  -0.0087 -0.0050 -0.029 
 
MS 
PubDef   0.0039 0.0637 0.375 
                
  DebExX  -0.024 -0.0154 -0.091 
  DebExGni  -0.020 -0.0005 -0.003 
 
ES 
CurAccX  0.018 0.0687 0.404 
                
  TradeP  0.009 0.0414 0.244 
 
SR 
PCRBOG  0.009 0.0453 0.266 
                
  ln(Roads)  0.026 0.0262 0.154 
  ln(Tel)  0.026 0.0187 0.110 
 
Phys 
      
  ln(Mort)   -0.0139 -0.0222 -0.130 
  ln(H1)   0.0139 0.0255 0.150 
 
MH1 
           
         
Source: Authors’ calculations.  41
Annex 12: Contribution to Growth: Countries’ Experience 
    
 
A12-1-Impact of Macroeconomic Stability  
   
Years (%)  MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1980-89   Contribution  -1.3  0.2  -0.01  -1.0  0.4  0.1  -2.6  -2.4 
1990-99  to Growth   0.4  0.4  0.7  0.8  1.3  0.6  0.3  0.6 
                             
1980-89  GDP per capita  0  1.6  1.4  0.1  2.2  -0.7  -3.5  -1.1 
1990-99  Growth Rate  1.7  3.2  0.5  -0.3  1.9  0.4  2.0  4.4 
                 
      A12-1.a- Inflation      
                          
Years     MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1970s  Inflation  9  6  7  8  16  11  10  8 
1980s  ( %)  13  9  8  9  17  7  20  23 
1990s  Average  11  5  4  20  13  5  24  8 
                             
1980-89  Annual   0.4  0.3  0.02  0.1  0.2  -0.4  0.9  1.4 
1990-99  Change  -0.2  -0.4  -0.3  1.1  -0.4  -0.2  0.4  -1.4 
Total: p + p*SR                         
1980-89   Contribution  -0.02  -0.01  -0.001  -0.004  -0.01  0.02  -0.05  -0.07 
1990-99  to Growth   0.01  0.02  0.02  -0.06  0.02  0.01  -0.02  0.07 
                 
     A12-1.b- Black Market Exchange Rate Premium    
                   
Years     MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1970s  bmp  23  19  6  79  30  3.5  20  7 
1980s  ( %)  207  9  6  330  28  4.3  793  282 
1990s  Average  268  5  4  191  13  4.5  1349  307 
                             
1980-89  Annual   22  -7.3  0.5  14  -0.7  2.0  37  37 
1990-99  Growth Rate  2.6  -4.9  -4.0  -5.5  -7.4  0.4  5.3  0.8 
Total: bmp+bmp*SR                         
1980-89   Contribution  -1.2  0.4  -0.03  -0.8  0.04  -0.1  -2.1  -2.1 
1990-99  to Growth   -0.1  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.4  -0.02  -0.3  -0.05 
                 
      A12-1.c- Public Deficit      
                           
Years     MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1970s  Public Deficit  -7.1  -2.9  -7.8  -5.1  -16.5  -9.9  -2.2  -5.4 
1980s  ( % GDP)  -7.8  -4.9  -7.6  -7.3  -12.5  -7.8  -7.3  -7.4 
1990s  Average  -1.6  -3.4  -2.8  -0.9  -2.5  -0.9  -0.6  -0.3 
                             
1980-89  Annual   0.03  0.2  -0.02  0.2  -0.4  -0.2  0.5  0.2 
1990-99  Change  -0.6  -0.2  -0.5  -0.6  -1  -0.7  -0.7  -0.7 
Total PubDef + PubDef*SR                         
1980-89   Contribution  -0.03  -0.2  0.02  -0.2  0.4  0.2  -0.4  -0.2 
1990-99  to Growth   0.5  0.1  0.4  0.6  0.9  0.6  0.6  0.6 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations  42
       A12-2- Impact of External Stability     
                             
Years   (%)  MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1980-89   Contribution  -1.0  0.1  -0.8  0.1  -0.9  -0.4     -2.4 
1990-99  to Growth   1.0  0.3  1.2  0.1  2.5  -1.1  0.6  0.8 
                             
1980-89  GDP per capita  0  1.6  1.4  0.1  2.2  -0.7  -3.5  -1.1 
1990-99  Growth Rate  1.7  3.2  0.5  -0.3  1.9  0.4  2.0  4.4 
             
                   A12-2.a- External Debt     
                             
Years     MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1970s   External Debt  121/141?  125  190  185  165  82     100 
1980s  ( % Exports)  219  139  300  178  350  136  42  389 
1990s  Average  201  129  230  231  220  220  84  365 
                             
1980-89  Annual   9.9  1.4  11  -0.7  19  5.4     29 
1990-99  Change   -1.8  -1.0  -7  5.3  -13  8.4  4.2  -2.4 
   LT Elasticity   -0.089                      
1980-89   Contribution  -0.9  -0.1  -1.0  0.1  -1.6  -0.5     -2.6 
1990-99  to Growth   0.2  0.1  0.6  -0.5  1.2  -0.7  -0.4  0.2 
                
                  A12-2.b- External Debt     
                             
Years     MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1970s   External Debt  28  33  33  37  48  30     17 
1980s  ( % GNI)  66  56  92  39  107  81  4  83 
1990s  Average  80  59  72  63  61  147  21  135 
                             
1980-89  Annual   3.8  2.3  5.9  0.1  5.9  5.0     6.6 
1990-99  Change   1.4  0.4  -2.0  2.4  -4.6  6.6  1.6  5.2 
   LT Elasticity  -0.003                      
1980-89   Contribution  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.0004  -0.02  -0.02     -0.02 
1990-99  to Growth   -0.004  0.00  0.01  -0.01  0.01  -0.02  0.00  -0.02 
                
         A12-2.c-Current Account Deficit    
                             
Years     MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1970s   Current Account  -17  -26  -35  -24  -50  -11  26  -19 
1980s  ( % Exports)  -20  -20  -31  -14  -30  -8  -20  -14 
1990s  Average  1  -15  -16  0  4  -16  4  4 
                             
1980-89  Annual   -0.3  0.6  0.4  1  2.0  0.3  -4.6  0.5 
1990-99  Change  2.1  0.5  1.5  1.4  3.4  -0.8  2.4  1.8 
   LT Elasticity  0.396                      
1980-89   Contribution  -0.1  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.8  0.1  -1.8  0.2 
1990-99  to Growth   0.8  0.2  0.6  0.6  1.3  -0.3  1.0  0.7 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations  43
 
 
     A12-4- Impact of Structural Reforms     
                       
Years  (%)   MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1980-89   Contribution  0.2   0.6  0.1  -0.1  0.4  0.5  -0.05  -0.05 
1990-99  to Growth   0.2  0.7  0.5  -0.8  -0.03  0.6  -0.1  0.4 
                             
1980-89  GDP per capita  0  1.6  1.4  0.1  2.2  -0.7  -3.5  -1.1 
1990-99  Growth Rate  1.7  3.2  0.5  -0.3  1.9  0.4  2.0  4.4 
              
                      A12-4.a-  Trade Policy     
                       
Years     MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1970s  Trade Openness  27  29  29  26  36  47  19  6 
1980s  ( % GDP)  26  47  31  11  41  43  7  3 
1990s  Average  33  62  37  15  37  57  10  15 
                             
1980-89  Annual   -0.1  1.8  0.2  -1.4  0.4  -0.4  -1.2  -0.3 
1990-99  Change  0.7  1.5  0.6  0.3  -0.4  1.4  0.3  1.3 
   LT Elasticity  0.24                      
1980-89   Contribution  -0.03  0.4  0.1  -0.3  0.1  -0.1  -0.3  -0.1 
1990-99  to Growth   0.2  0.4  0.1  0.1  -0.1  0.3  0.1  0.3 
               
          A12-4.b-  Financial Development   
                      
Years     MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1970s  Private Credit  27  41  20  43  18  39  24  6 
1980s  ( % GDP)  35  47  21  52  28  59  33  7 
1990s  Average  35  59  34  19  31  69  26  9 
                             
1980-89  Annual   0.8  0.6  0.1  1.0  1.1  2.0  0.9  0.1 
1990-99  Change  0.01  1.2  1.3  -3.3  0.3  1.0  -0.6  0.3 
   LT Elasticity  0.27                      
1980-89   Contribution  0.2  0.2  0.03  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.2  0.02 
1990-99  to Growth   0.0  0.3  0.4  -0.9  0.1  0.3  -0.2  0.1 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 44
 
 
       A12-5- Impact of Human Capital     
                        
Years   (%)  MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1980-89   Contribution  1.1  1.2  1.0  1.2  0.7  0.6  1.3  1.3 
1990-99  to Growth   0.9  0.9  0.8  1.2  0.8  0.4  1.2  0.9 
                             
1980-89  GDP per capita  0  1.6  1.4  0.1  2.2  -0.7  -3.5  -1.1 
1990-99  Growth Rate  1.7  3.2  0.5  -0.3  1.9  0.4  2.0  4.4 
             
            A12-5.a- Primary Education     
                       
Years     MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1970s  Primary Education  2.4  2.7  1.2  2.1  4.9  2.6  1.6  1.7 
1980s  (nbr of years)  3.0  4.0  1.8  3.1  3.1  3.5  2.6  2.7 
1990s  Average  3.7  4.8  2.3  3.9  3.6  4.0  3.9  3.7 
                             
1980-89  Annual   2.8  3.9  3.9  3.7  -4.4  3.2  4.9  4.6 
1990-99  Growth Rate  2.3  1.8  2.4  2.5  1.3  1.4  4.1  3.4 
   LT Elasticity  0.14                      
1980-89   Contribution  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  -0.6  0.4  0.7  0.6 
1990-99  to Growth   0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.6  0.5 
             
              A12-5.b- Infant Mortality     
                       
Years     MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1970s  Infant Mortality  122  99  117  123  277  43  118  79 
1980s  (/1000 population)  65  56  81  71  95  37  70  47 
1990s  Average  41  33  56  36  57  32  43  34 
                             
1980-89  Annual   -6.3  -5.8  -3.7  -5.6  -10.7  -1.5  -5.2  -5.3 
1990-99  Growth Rate  -4.5  -5.1  -3.8  -6.8  -5.1  -1.6  -4.9  -3.2 
   LT Elasticity  -0.12                      
1980-89   Contribution  0.8  0.7  0.4  0.7  1.3  0.2  0.6  0.6 
1990-99  to Growth   0.5  0.6  0.5  0.8  0.6  0.2  0.6  0.4 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.   45
 
 
      A12-6- Impact of Physical Infrastructures    
                        
Years  (%)   MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1980-89   Contribution  1.4  1.3  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.6  1.8  1.5 
1990-99  to Growth   1.0  1.0  1.3  0.5  -0.9  0.5  1.7  1.4 
                             
1980-89  GDP per capita  0  1.6  1.4  0.1  2.2  -0.7  -3.5  -1.1 
1990-99  Growth Rate  1.7  3.2  0.5  -0.3  1.9  0.4  2.0  4.4 
             
      A12-6.a- Telephone Lines     
                        
Years     MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1970s  Telephone Lines  14  11  7  9  9  17  17  16 
1980s  (/1000 population)  28  26  11  24  17  52  28  39 
1990s  Average  59  58  40  41  37  74  75  78 
                             
1980-89  Annual   7.2  8.1  4.7  10  6..8  11.2  4.9  8.5 
1990-99  Growth Rate  7.5  8.1  13.1  5.5  8.2  3.6  9.8  7 
   LT Elasticity  0.10                      
1980-89   Contribution  0.8  0.8  0.5  1.0  0.7  1.1  0.5  0.9 
1990-99  to Growth   0.8  0.8  1.3  0.5  0.8  0.4  1.0  0.7 
                
      A12-6.b- Road Network     
                       
Years     MENA  Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
1970s  Road Network  0.068  0.121  0.094  0.032  0.025  0.043  0.035  0.092 
1980s  (km/km2)  0.093  0.168  0.130  0.032  0.032  0.060  0.085  0.141 
1990s  Average  0.111  0.188  0.133  0.030  0.009  0.065  0.135  0.218 
                             
1980-89  Annual   3.0  3.3  3.2  -0.1  1.8  3.2  8.9  4.2 
1990-99  Growth Rate  1.8  1.1  0.2  -0.5  -11.3  0.8  4.6  4.4 
   LT Elasticity  0.15                      
1980-89   Contribution  0.6  0.5  0.5  -0.01  0.3  0.5  1.3  0.6 
1990-99  to Growth   0.3  0.2  0.03  -0.1  -1.7  0.1  0.7  0.7 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  46
 
                A12-7-Contributions to Growth %      
        Summary                  
Years (%)  MENA Tunisia  Morocco Algeria Egypt  Jordan  Iran  Syria 
Macroeconomic Stability                            
1980-89   Contribution  -1.3  0.2  -0.01  -1  0.4  0.1  -2.6  -2.4 
1990-99  to Growth   0.4  0.4  0.7  0.8  13  0.6  0.3  0.6 
External Stability                            
1980-89   Contribution  -1  0.1  -0.8  0.1  -0.9  -0.4     -2.4 
1990-99  to Growth   1  0.3  1.2  0.1  2.5  -1.1  0.6  0.8 
Structural Reforms                            
1980-89   Contribution  0.2  0.6  0.1  -0.1  0.4  0.5  -0.05  -0.05 
1990-99  to Growth   0.2  0.7  0.5  -0.8  -0.03  0.6  -0.1  0.4 
Human Capital                            
1980-89   Contribution  1.1  1.2  1  1.2  0.7  0.6  1.3  1.3 
1990-99  to Growth   0.9  0.9  0.8  1.2  0.8  0.4  1.2  0.9 
Physical Infrastructures                            
1980-89   Contribution  1.4  1.3  1  1  1.0  1.6  1.8  1.5 
1990-99  to Growth   1  1  1.3  0.5  -0.9  0.5  1.7  1.4 
Investment                            
1980-89   Contribution  -0.3  0.1  0.1  -0.3  -1.5  -0.24  -0.1  -0.03 
1990-99  to Growth   -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.4  0.01  0.15  0.15 
Total                            
1980-89   Contribution  0.1  3.5  1.4  0.9  0.1  2.2  0.4  -2.1 
1990-99  to Growth   3.4  3.2  4.4  1.6  3.3  1.0  3.9  4.3 
GDP per capita                             
1980-89  Annual   0  1.6  1.4  0.1  2.2  -0.7  -3.5  -1.1 
1990-99  Growth Rate  1.7  3.2  0.5  -0.3  1.9  0.4  2  4.4 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  47




Since our variables are cointegrated, the short-term dynamic adjustment of the GDP per capita toward 
its equilibrium level can be estimated through an error correction model. The estimated equation is as follows: 
 
∆ln(y i,t) = - a [ln(y i,t -1) - ln(y∗ i,t- 1 )]  
+ a’ ∆ln(y i,t -1 )  
+ b1.∆ln(Inv i,t) + b2.∆(SRi,t) + b3.∆(MSi,t) + b4.∆(ESi,t)  
+ b5.∆( MSi,t* SRi,t) + b6.∆( ESi,t* SRi,t) 
+ b7.∆(Physi,t) + b8.∆(MH1i,t)  
+ c1.∆ln(Inv i,t -1) + c2.∆(SRi,t -1) + c3.∆(MSi,t -1)+c4.∆(ESi,t -1)  
+ c5.∆(MSi,t* SRi, t -1) + c6.∆(ESi,t* SRi, t -1) 
+c7.∆(Physi,t -1) + c8.∆(MH1i,t-1)                                                          (A13) 
 
In addition to the error correction term, i.e., the lagged error term of the cointegrating equation [ ln(y i,t -
1) - ln(y∗ i,t- 1)], we include the current and the lagged variables of Equation (2) in first differences. Table A13 
below shows the estimates of the error correction model. 
 
Table A13: Estimates of the Error Correction Model 
Dependent variable: ∆ln(yt) 
 
 Variable  Elasticity  Student 
  ε1t-1*  -1.1    (8.51) 
  ∆ln(y i, t-1 )  -0.96 (7.23) 
 ∆ln (Inv i, t)  -0.14         (3.57) 
  ∆( MS i, t )   0.001       (0.21) 
  ∆( ES i, t)  0.004       (0.79) 
  ∆( SR i, t)  -0.004      (0.41) 
  ∆( MSi,t* SRi,t)  0.002 (0.92) 
  ∆( ESi,t* SRi,t)  0.001 (0.63) 
  ∆(Phys i, t)  0.016 (0.77) 
  ∆( MH1i,t)  -0.02 (1.50) 
  ∆ln(Inv i, t-1)  0.03 (0.88) 
  ∆( MS i, t-1)   0.0003 (0.08) 
  ∆( ES i, t-1)  -0.001 (0.25) 
  ∆( SR i, t-1)  -0.001 (0.10) 
  ∆(MSi,t* SRi, t -1)  0.002 (0.  87) 
  ∆(ESi,t* SRi, t -1)  0.0005 (0.  56) 
  ∆(Physi, t-1)  0.13 (0.52) 
  ∆( MH1i,t -1)  0.04 (1.58) 
 D-W    2.20  1.91 
Note: Student t statistics are within brackets. The sample includes 149 observations  over 1970-80 to1999. (*) ε1t-1 is 
the lagged error term of the cointegrating Equations (1). Data have been compiled from World Development 
Indicators (WDI), Global Development Finance (GDF), Global Development Network  (GDN), and Live Data Base 
(LDB) (World Bank).   
Source: Authors’ estimations 
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